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Salah satu topik yang keras-kepala dalam filsafat politik
adalah ihwal hubungan antara individu dan komunitas.
Sepanjang sejarah kita temukan gerak mondar-mandir
antara kedua kutub itu : di satu pihak ada tendensi
memrioritaskan otonomi dan martabat individu sambil
mengorbankan komunitas, di pihak lain sebaliknya,
memrioritaskan komunitas sambil mengerdilkan martabat
individu. Berdasarkan pengalaman dan paradigma Afrika,
penulis menawarkan jalan tengah : kedua kutub mesti
dilihat sebagai saling terhubung tak terpisahkan.
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The question of the relationship between the individual and the
community is an outstanding feature of the modern society. The history
of mankind is one that is replete with an 'admixture' of various forms of
relationships: there is on one hand, some form of suppressions and
repressions of individual aspirations and capabilities in favour of some sort
of collectivity; and on the other hand, an unbridled and exaggerated form
of individual freedom and autonomy even at the expense of collective
interests. Mankind's history thus, is hanging as on a pendulum tilting now
right and then left depending on the prevalent social structure.
The type of social structure evolved in any particular society seems to
be conditioned by the culture of the people which is given expression in
their over-all philosophy of life. People with 'socio-centric' and 'organic'
philosophic mindsets would like to take active interest in one another's
affairs, and feel at ease in regulating and being regulated by others. Such a
people will have no qualms in subordinating individual interests to that of
the collectivity thereby making individuals to be no more than appendages
to the entity (community). Others with 'egocentric' and 'contractual'
philosophic mindsets, on the other hand, would see to the exaltation of
individual interests over communal ones; the parts over the whole. For
such groups, there is the tendency to exhibit some form of 'naked
individualism' which exaggerates one-sidedly the distinctness of each of
the units that make up the whole thereby leaving every individual progress /
survival at the mercy of the fluctuations of demand and supply in the open
market economy.
The challenge of unmitigated 'communalism' or 'individualism' has left
its scares in the sands of history especially within the African heritage. In
an attempt perhaps, to charter a middle course, theoreticians now question
about the status of the rights of the individual whether these are so
primary that they cannot be overridden in any circumstance? The place of
duties how does the individual see his socio-ethical roles in relation to the
interest and welfare of others? And the existence and appreciation of a
sense of common life how does the individual view his individuality
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amidst the over-all social group to which he naturally belongs? Indeed,
where lays the heart of this symbiotic union between the individual and the
community in African cultures? Here, we shall attempt to examine these




Individuality as A Principle of Existence
Besides what is in the mind, only individual realities exist. The act of
existing is proper to, and is exercised only by individual beings. This does
not vitiate the fact that collective realities such as communities do exist,
even though such realities are constituted of individuals. Maritain observes:
Individuality is opposed to the state of universality, which
things have in the mind. It designates that concrete state of
unity and indivision, required by existence, in virtue of which
every actually or possibly existing nature can posit itself in
existence as distinct from other beings.
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Individuality thus, is the principle of distinction and identity in existent
realities. It is the uniqueness of the proper existence of the subsistent
existent. Even though St. Thomas claims there is a subtle distinction
between the 'Individual' and the 'Individuum' insisting that the former is
wider in scope than the later, their descriptions virtually portray the same
meaning: an entity that spurns all universality by reason of its intrinsic
indivisibility and exclusivity. An individual, therefore, is “that which is in
itself an undivided unit, and is distinguished from all other things”. It does
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not inhere in another subject, and cannot be predicated of another, either
generically or specifically. To denominate an individual from all other
individuals, one needs to look into the properties the aggregate of which are
never the same in another. This then, is individuation. Individuation
makes this particular woman Chinenye O., an individual, singular and
unique because she is the daughter of Agnes O., born at Nguru, Mbaise,
Nigeria, twentieth of March, 1972, five feet three inches in height, eighty-
five pounds weight. These stamp a woman with individuality.
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Scholasticism puts into perspective questions regarding individuation.
Following the precedence of St. Thomas, and his re-employment of the
Aristotelian categories of 'substance and accident'; 'matter and form'; 'act
and potency' Scholasticism lays claim to the existence of three forms of
individuation:
A: Substance - that is, an entity which exists by itself individuates itself by
itself;
B: Accident - is individuated by the substance in which it inheres;
C:Pure forms (e.g. Angels) - subsistent and independent of matter,
individuate themselves by themselves.
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Nevertheless, in man, as in all other corporal beings like the stone, the
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atom, the plant, the animal, etc, matter is the principle of individuation.
The Angelic Doctor teaches that the individuality of these corporeal
entities is rooted in matter in as much as matter requires the occupation in
space of a position distinct from every other position. Matter itself is a kind
of ability to receive forms, and is always subjected to substantial mutations.
In every being made of matter, there is always a union with the “form”
which together constitutes a substantial unit distinct from every other unit.
The form, in such a union is thus particularized in such a material being
which may share the same specific nature (form) with other material beings.
The specificity of material beings sharing the same specific nature, then, lies
in their material composition. Bogliolo observes:
It is matter alone, which makes possible a multiplicity of
identical forms that are individually different, in the manner
that Peter is not Paul, even if they are twins.
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In man, therefore, the form, which is the human soul, together with the
matter, which it informs, constitutes one substance, which is both carnal
and spiritual. Soul and matter are two substantial co-principles of the same
being, of one and the same reality, individual and distinct from each other.
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The situation of pure forms or angelic realities is quite different. The
angels as pure forms or pure spirits are, by reason of that which constitutes
their substantiality, in the state of individuality. Pure forms individuate
themselves by themselves. The Divine Essence is supremely individual.
Angels are individual essences, which differ from each other, according to
St. Thomas, as the whole species of lions differs from the whole species of
horses. Hence, “each angel differs specifically from every other; each is an
individual by the very form (absolutely free from any mater) in which its
being consists and which constitutes it in its species.”
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The common characteristic of all existents, that is, 'individuality', does
not issue forth from the same principle in corporeal beings as in pure spirits.
Corporeal beings are individual because of matter. Their specific forms are
not individual by reason of their own entity, but by reason of their
extraordinary relation to matter. On the other hand, pure spirits are
individual by reason of that which constitutes their substantial intelligibility.
Man, thus, is an individual; a stone is an individual; a plant is an individual; a
dog, as well as an angel is an individual. Every entity, which exists undivided
and distinct from every other existent, is an individual. Individuality
excludes from oneself all that other men are, and includes in one all that
other men are not.
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Man as An Existent Individual
The human being, as a subsisting entity thus, is an individual. He shares
individuality with stones, trees, animals, etc because of their common
patrimony in material composition. This is at the base of the manifestation
of the principle of individuality which encompasses all material existent
realities. But by reason of the extraordinary relation of the rational soul to
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matter, man attains an infinitely greater height of individuality than other
material entities. He is more than a mere parcel of matter or an individual
element in nature such as an atom, a tree or a dog. Where lies the dignity or
liberty of an atom? On what do the rights of an individual piece of tree
consist? It would make no sense to say that a dog or monkey gives its life for
the liberty or rights of the dog or monkey. That would be a preposterous
extrapolation. Man undoubtedly, is an animal and an individual, but unlike
other animals or individuals, he stands out by his intelligence and will. Over
against the merely physical existence, there is in him a richer and nobler
spiritual existence through knowledge, and by which he can communicate
to other selves / individuals. He is thus, an entity whose individuality is
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projected not only by material distinctness, but also by his capacity for
evaluation and choice.
The capacity for intelligence, or at least the type of intelligence
exhibited in this planet by humans, brings man's individuality into the arena
of natural law and the enjoyment of rights and execution of duties
consequent upon such a law. Human intelligence formulates laws which by
reason and the will of man are ascribed to nature. These laws, when
expanded give birth to the customs of a particular community. But
fundamentally, they prescribe some inalienable rights to the individual
person, like the right to the existence of life; the right to personal freedom;
the right to the pursuit of the perfection of moral and rational human life;
the right to the pursuit of eternal good; the right to private ownership of
material goods which is a safeguard of the liberties of the individual, etc.
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These confer to the individual the unquantifiable leverage to organize his
life as it suits him. It means that the notion of individuality for man
involves that of 'totality' and 'independence'. As an individual, man subsists
as a whole, and in an independent manner no matter the imperfections
impinged on him by the accidents of matter.
Human individuality is a project that emphasizes the individual's
freedom, self-domination and self-selection. It is a theoretical expression
of the individual's separated situation which insists that the end of all is the
individual as such. In his paper, “Characteristics of the Marxist Theory of
12
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Collectivity”, Junzhong goes forth to insist that the emergence of
individualism in real life reflects the demands of the development of
capitalism. For him, it mirrors the separated situation of human beings
which results from the competition introduced by a commodity economy,
and “opposes external restraints and various dominations imposed on
individuals by authorities, especially by the state” Elsewhere Junzhong
13
also notes that “this theory (of individualism) does not encourage people to
seek personal interests regardless of common interests and of the concerns
of others”, which, in my opinion, is an apparent contradiction to some of
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his earlier claims. How can a doctrine which opposes external restrains and
dominations not encourage people to seek personal interests regardless of
common interests? How can such a philosophy justifiably advocate that
individual interests should be subordinated to the interest of the state when
the two conflict? I think Junzhong's problem here, may have arisen from
his inability to pull the subtle difference between 'individuality' and
'individualism' thereby interchanging one for the other. Consequently, his
manifest contradictory conclusions are only predictable.
Now, 'individuality' refers to the quality or characteristics that make one
person or thing different from others; the quality or state of being an
individual subsistent entity, while 'individualism' on the other hand, is
rooted in 'egocentricism'. It confers the idea of 'self-assertion in disregard
for others'; the position that private economic enterprise should not be
restricted by government or social regulation. Any system of morals,
15
feelings, ideas and institutions in which individuals are organized by their
mutual isolation and defense is strictly individualistic in character.
Stretched to its logical conclusion, 'individualism' represents the
centralization of the individual in himself and the demonstration that the
human subject can be nourished by auto-digestion. This is rarely a
16
defensible position in real life situation owing to the interdependent nature
of human life. Understandably, man is a distinct individual. But he is an
individual whose uniqueness and identity are to be exercised within the
community of humans.
Communalism in African Thought-pattern
In most African traditional cultures, the idea of the individual person is,
for the most part, tied to the idea of the community. The community here is
characterized as a life community in which there is an intimate personal
interaction among human beings as opposed to the recently impersonal
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modern urban set-up where every one minds his or her own business. In a
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typical African setting, community is neither to be understood in the
additive sense of the aggregated sum of individuals comprising it, nor in the
constituted sense of a non-organic bringing together of atomic individuals
into a unit akin to an association. In African community, there is an
assumed organic dimension to the relationship between the component
individuals. Community here is constituted of a group of people who
together experience reciprocity of awareness. The existence of common
18
ties, and / or biological bonds, interdependent relationships, common
interests and goals is crucial to an adequate conception of community; that
existence in fact constitutes a people into a community, into a social train
driven by communalism.
Each community embodies a traditional culture which is sacrosanct to
all members, and by which the community life is structured. The primary
requirement of tradition on the part of the individual is total compliance
with the specific beliefs and customs prevalent in the community.
Dissension here is viewed as a disruption to the community life and is
effectively repressed by the punishment of the culprit(s) as prescribed by
the tradition. Here, the interest of the community prevails over that of the
individual, and all values that promote individual self-interest, as is common
in urbanized societies, are effectively suppressed. Negro-African societies,
according to Senghor, 'puts more stress on the group than on the
individuals, more on solidarity than on the activity and needs of the
individual, more on the communion of persons than on their autonomy.
Ours is a community society'. For Dickson, communalism is a
19
characteristic feature that defines 'Africannes'. The personal life is the
20
communal life and the communal life is the personal life. One cannot be
without the other. An individual that tries to live outside his community will
be like a fish cast out of water onto a dry sandy beach, panting.
21
However, it is pertinent to point out that the concept of tradition does
not in any way portray that the African socio-political ordering is
communist in nature. Obiechina observes:
It would be wrong to interpret the concentration on common
goals and the primacy of the common interest as a matter of
suppression of the personality from the outside, of constraint
on the part of an authority. Social conformity and the
discouragement of deviation from the common norms of
behaviour are not the same thing as the repressive curbing of
individual freedom. Social freedom is in the final analysis related
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to legality and this is commonly expressed as the principle of
the greatest good of the greatest number. Traditional social
philosophy is based on this principle and because it is
fundamental to the very survival and general health of the
society, is given validity by being anchored in customary practice
and protected by divine and ancestral authority.
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Even though the village community is not a police state, every breach
of the tradition is detested by the entire community because its tragic
consequence(s) will not only fall on the individual culprit, but also on the
community to which he belongs. Hence, there is a strict obedience to the
'law of the land' even when it runs against the individual will. After all, 'the
land' (community) is the custodian of the individual person.
Traditional African life was, and very much still is community-based: it
moves from the community and revolves around the community. A man's
achievement depends primarily on how much of his community's
standards he accommodates. To exist is to exist in a group. To a large
extent, the individual in an African society is subsumed within the
requirements of his community. He, more or less acts out his community's
scripts.
This community structure of African societies, especially within the
sub-Sahara, engenders a high spirit of communalism. Every one
contributes something to the common stock. Their cooperative
community spirit goes a long way to portray their altruism: community
interests come before personal interests, as the power of the community is
superior over that of an individual. This is evidenced in such Igbo sayings
like (the relatives or community is one's strength/power);Umunna bu ike
Anaghi eleli-amala eleli (you cannot neglect the community); etc. Africans
carry out their civic and social responsibilities according to the provisions
of community tradition. At one time, it may require a participation in a
communal labour, as in clearing of village pathways; at other times it may
demand all the members of the community to cultivate a member's
farmland. When one's palm tree is being tapped, it specifies certain days
when one makes available the palm wine for general free consumption; and
when one's daughter is married, it specifies the community's share of the
dowry paid. These afford everyone the opportunity of contributing one's
own quota to the growth of the community that has nursed one into
existence. Indeed, every individual contributes his / her resources, human
and material in times of communal conflicts, and as the need demands.
Internal peace and order are maintained by everyone's unalloyed obedience
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to the (tradition) even when such a tradition impinges onOmenala
individual's well-being. In Achebe's , the conversationThings Fall Apart
between Okonkwo and Obierika over their prohibition from tapping palm
wine because of their title, and Okonkwo's incisive conclusion that 'theOzo
law of the land must be obeyed', is very instructive here.
23
The mark of a true African is his ability to put communal interests over
and above his individual interests. Even when the community sponsors her
talented sons in education or business, she sponsors them so that they will
use their enhanced social status for the benefit of the community. When a
member of the family or clan is honoured or successful, the whole group
rejoices and shares in the glory, not only psychologically, as one would
rejoice when one's local team has won a match, but ontologically: each
member of the group is really part of the honour. Individual persons
24
compete not just for their survival, but also for the survival of the
community, which competes in and through them. Individual competitive
spirit is always engendered by communal competitive spirit. The members
of the community could be bound together with the common aim of
building up their own society more than their neighbours. Ottenberg has
this to say:
Villagers compete to build the first and best schools, village
groups, to improve the market. Many social groups strive to
push some of their talented sons ahead in schooling and to
obtain scholarship in competition with other groups.
Individuals who acquire scholarship, wealth or political
influence are expected to use their social stand for the benefit
of the group with which they are associated
25
This, nevertheless, does not imply that the individuals' needs are
unimportant. No, it rather suggests that in the symbiotic union between
the individual person and the community, the individual realizes that he
cannot achieve his selfhood in isolation of the community. His personhood
is inextricably bound by the determinations of his community.
The Struggle of The Individual in a Communalistic Culture
The principal issue in the exchange of relationship between the
individual and the community is to decipher which the individual or
community has the ontological priority over the other, and in consequence,
which has the ontological derivativeness. A clear-cut determination of this
will undoubtedly delimit the influence of one over the other, and thus put
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to rest the age-long enquiry enshrouded in ceaseless disputatiousness. But
this is not so easy a task to require an either / or answer given the nature of
the object under scrutiny who himself is the enquiring subject.
It is an undisputed fact that the individual human being is born into an
existing human community, into a cultural society. The individual
therefore, is never a pure, isolated individual. Using the Igbo saying, mmadu
anaghi agba ka ugba a human being does not fall like a bolt by some
inexplicable explosive mechanism, Okere maintains that there is no big
bang that throws a human being from nowhere into the world. “Every one
has a source, a link, a belongingness, the parents being the source of their
children. Everyone comes into the world belonging and relating”. The
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community alone constitutes the social context in which the individual
could actualize his potentialities and even express his individuality. The
individual thus, is a congenitally communitarian individual, incapable of
being, existing and really unthinkable except in the complex of relations of
the community.
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This all-encompassing primeval power of the community over the
individual gives a strong impetus to the communalistic structure of African
societies, which is manifestly expressed in virtually all aspects of their
culture: in their arts and aesthetics, in their value system and over-all
philosophy of life, and in their interrelationship with each other. There
seems to be some form of communal spirit hanging over every individual
action, determining and directing the flow of events. Many a time, the
entire individuals within the community benefit from such a communalistic
structure because it operates generally on the principle of the greatest good
of the greatest number: the extended family system makes it imperative for
one to be deeply concerned about the well being of others in the group; the
'community system of marriage' safeguards the individual from getting
28
himself entangled in a family known for her notoriety; the social security
mandates a child to take care of his aged parents; the sense of hospitality
and the promotion of communal social order are of course motivated by
the well-being of the community, its solidarity, co-operation, mutual
concerns and reciprocal obligations. Here, the good or love of the group as
a whole is taken to include the good or love of the individual members so
that enhancement of the good or love of the community implies the
enhancement of individual lives. Everyone's care is everyone's duty.
29
Using Marx's expression, communality in Africa engenders a high sense of
love and respect among individual members of the traditional community
such that 'from each according to his ability to each according to his needs'.
At other times, and which are very many indeed, the individual
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however, is completely subsumed within communality such that he
becomes no more than a mere appendage to the group, with over-
burdening duties and without corresponding rights. Undoubtedly, the
extended family system and other communal systems promote the general
wellbeing of others, but they also tend to stifle the full development of the
individual. The individual is not given any free and conducive atmosphere
to develop his potentialities to maximal capacity. He is either discriminated
against because of some socio-cultural stigmas (as in the caste system), or is
constantly burdened with other people's problems and worries that he
hardly has time enough to concentrate on his plans and projects. Individual
decisions on matters of private importance, as in the choice of marriage
partner, the modalities of marrying and the procreation of children, etc are
often subjected to public scrutiny, which in the end may distort or even
entirely destroy the primary intent of the individual concerned. The
individual thus, is hemmed in all aspects, and discovers that his life is more
or less a recycle of the old unadventurous traditional life.
Not only is the individual entangled in the web of exerting himself for
the wellbeing of all traceable blood relations, the community itself seems to
be invested with an all-engulfing functional and normative authority to
determine everything about the life of the individual. The quality of his life
and personhood depend, to a great extent, on his ability to conform to
specific norms and values of his community. Menkiti captures the idea in
these vivid words: “without incorporation into this or that community,
individuals are considered to be mere danglers to whom the description
'person' does not fully apply.”30 'Personhood' among Africans, as rightly
argued by Menkiti is thus, 'processual' in nature, and is fully conferred on
the individual by the community to which he belongs. Prior to this
conferment, the individual has a somewhat worthless status in the
community, and could not be entrusted with any task of importance. Once
conferred, he enters into the state of responsibility whereby he inherits new
rights, and new obligations are expected of him by the community.31 This
is a very discriminatory practice and has been identified as ultimately
responsible for a myriad of socio-political malaise that have long ravaged
the entire continent.
In the first place, the communalistic structure of African societies
places the power to rule in the hands of those who the society has conferred
with the status of personhood in exclusion of others. This gives them
undue leverage over others especially in matters of communal life. Little
attention, if any, is paid to the contributions of the uninitiated. Often,
objectivity is sacrificed at the altar of authority, while mediocrity is
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celebrated under the pretext of maintaining tradition. relegationOkonkwo's
of to the status of a woman, in Achebe's is a clearOsugo Things Fall Apart
indication of such a flagrant abuse of power.
Second, this structure of personhood as arising from the community
engenders a high sense of hospitality, communality and altruism for one's
ethnic group especially at the micro level. At this level, the different sub-
cultural groups organize themselves independently of each other such that
all life activities evolve and revolve around the immediate community. In a
typical communalistic society, the immediate community sets goals, and
enforces reward or punishment for her individual members. Personhood,
strictly speaking, is personhood within the immediate community. Beyond
the immediate community, there is neither loyalty nor compelling force of
authority.
A parochial structure of this sort does not leave much room for inter-
community relationship at the macro level. Driven by the urge to satisfy the
needs of her immediate members, each community competes with others
for the scarce resources of nature. Often, the competition leads to
confrontation, and confrontation to crisis. The preponderance of
communal conflicts among the traditional Africans is consequent upon the
structuring of their society. Any society that is segmented without a central
organizing force is bound to constantly combat the whims and caprices of
individual segments seeking for supremacy.
Third, the high rate of instability in the art of governance within
African nations is ultimately traceable to the communal idea of the
individual human person. This 'communal idea' brings with it a community
consciousness, a consciousness that sees the communities fighting in and
through their individual members.
Each time an individual is placed in a position of leadership, he sees
himself first as a member of a specific community whose primary task is to
promote his communal selfhood, before anything else. In doing so, he
gives undue preference to issues pertaining to his primal community, while
the problems of other segments of the same society are treated with levity.
Political appointments are based not on merit, but on tribal sentiments,
while policies of economic reconstruction are experimented only on the
'select' few communities. It is a 'win-and-take-all' jungle society where the
Machiavellian principle of 'might is right' reigns supreme. This form of
32
injustice and alienation of people from their main purpose of living
together can only but give rise to uprisings, sabotaging of government
policies, coups and counter coups, and various forms of dissension that
lead to instability in governance.
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African communalism as a theory assumes a stunning concern for
communal values, for common good, and for the good of the wider society.
In doing so, it attempts to provide a conducive atmosphere that will enable
each individual to function adequately in a human community, with the
interest of the community as the over-riding rule. Generally speaking, the
idea of individuality is not antithetical to that of community; it even
advocates that individual interest be subordinated to that of the community
when the two conflict. Even in 'egocentric' societies, it is recognized that
the interest of the state, the incarnation of the general will, is the highest
good. Consequently, individual or family interests must be subordinated to
that of the community / state when they conflict with the latter.
Although it is understandable that the communal structure will allow
the community to exercise her primordial right over individual interests, yet
it is expected that communalism should not deny individuals the exercise of
their unique qualities, talents and dispositions. Communalism should not
restrict the individual from the exercise of his basic rights and freedom even
though it must see that he does not slip down the slop of 'stark selfishness'
or 'naked individualism'. At the practical level however, African
communalism, to its chagrin, has not given free rein to the exercise of these
tremendous qualities of the individual, and as such has been a clog on the
wheels of its socio-economic and political development.
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